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In the Supren1e Court of the 
State of Utah 
KNUDSEN MUSIC COMPANY, a 
corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
JACK MASTERSON, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
CASE 
NO. 7696 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
(All bold fiace, unless otherwise noted, are respondent's) 
The respondent believes that the appellant's statement 
of the facts is misleading because it fails to include certain 
essential facts and mis-states others so as to leave infer-
ences that are not directly warranted; consequently, with 
the following revisions to the appellant's facts, a more true 
and accurate statement will be had. 
Plaintiff and defendant entered into a contract on Feb-
ruary 27, 1950, under which the defendant refinanced three 
machines he had in his possession, two Model 1015's and 
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one Gismo model and under which he traded in two older 
model 1100's on two new Model 1080's (Tr. 6, 7, 9, 10, 92). 
The appellant states on page three of his brief that 
the new contract of February 27, 1950, was made because 
the two 1100 machines were defective. This mis-states 
the faots in that it fails to show that the primary purpose 
for the new contract was because the defendant found it 
necessary to refinance his machines, and because he had 
been notified that the machines would be repossessed un-
less he took steps to rectify his delinquent payments (Tr. 
page 6). 
Counsel infer~, by stating on page three of his brief, 
that the No. 1080 machines "were represented as new ma-
chines"; that they were not new machines. It is uncon-
tradicted that these machines, the 1080's, were new and 
that they were packed in their original cases and had not 
been opened when delivered to the vendee (Tr. 10, 42, 44, 
51). 
Attached to each machine was a warranty by the man-
ufacturer warranting the workmanship and the working 
parts of the machine and which warranty the defendant 
read and knew about (Tr. 78, 79). 
The defendant, at the time of picking up the new ma-
chines at the plaintiff's Provo office, had every right and 
oportunity to open and inspect the machines (Tr. 78). 
The defendant testified that he read the contract and 
was familiar with the terms thereof and that he knew of 
Paragraph F1our, which is set out as follows: 
"No warranties, representations or agreements 
have been made by Seller unless specifically set forth 
herein, and this contract may not be enlarged, modi-
fied, or altered except by endorsement hereon by the 
parties hereto." 
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He testified that there was no representation made by 
the plaintiff as to the condition of the machines ( Tr. 81) . 
The defendant, on page two of his brief, sets out pro-
visions which he says relate to the rights after reposses-
sion. In addition to the portion of paragraph six that he 
sets out on page two, paragraph eight of the contract (Ex. 
A) is also applicable. 
Counsel for the defendant states on page three that 
the mechanical portions of the phonograph were covered 
with rust and corrosion. This is disputable and is not 'Con-
clusive, as shown by the testimony of the plaintiff (Tr. 108, 
109). 
The defendant had these machine for five weeks or 
longer and during this time he did not complain of their 
service and did not notify the seller of any defects in the 
machines (Tr. 54, 80), nor make any attempts to enforce 
the warranty (Tr. 78, 79) on the machines made by the 
manufacturer (Tr. 554, 80). 
The appellant states on page four of his brief that he 
removed the machines because they did not operate; how-
ever, he does not include in his brief the fact that the ven-
dor, Mr. Knudsen, called him in the first part of April, five 
weeks after the machines had been on location, and told 
him that unless he made a payment the machines would 
be repossessed, and at that time Mr. Masterson first in-
formed Mr. Knudsen that the machines were not operating · 
to his satisfaction (Tr. 75). Mr. Knudsen testified that 
the vendee at this time, did not tell him that there was. any-
thing materially wrong with the machines other than they 
needed oiling when he received them (Tr. 54). Subsequent 
to this conversation the machines were removed from lo-
cation. 
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Counsel states on page four of his brief that the de-
fendant wrote the plaintiff that he was going to lose his 
best locations. There is no evidence that the defendant 
wrote to the plaintiff or that the plaintiff ever received 
any word from the defendant by letter as stated on page 
four (Tr. 98, 99). 
The defendant testified that the machines were in good 
enough shape to place them on location in the first place 
and that they were apparently serviceable and that "he 
could get by with them" (Tr. 91, 92). 
After the machines had been on location four or five 
weeks, the plaintiff notified the defendant that no pay-
ments had been made on the contract, and that unless he 
did make up the delinquent payments it would be neces-
sary to repossess the machines (Tr. 10, 11, 75, 88). Not 
until that date did the defendant notify the plaintiff of any 
defecti in the machines themselves (Tr. 92). 
No payment having been received, the plaintiff, in the 
latter part of April, found it necessary to send a man to 
Panguitch to repossess the machines from the defendant 
(Tr. 59). The plaintiff's president, Mr. Wesley Knudsen, 
testified that when the machines came back he personally 
made a careful inspection of them and that it was neces-
sary to service these machines so as to make them saleable, 
but that the machines were serviceable and that they were 
placed in good working :condition. by mere adjustments, 
and that he could find no evidence of "rust or corrosion" 
and that there was nothing wrong with the cmahines other 
than normal wear and tear (Tr. 49, 54, 108, 109, 110). 
The plaintiff testified that his company's fiscal year 
ended June 30 and that it was necessary to set these ma-
chines up on the books ·of the company, for they were as-
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sets of the company and were in its possession; consequent-
ly, they had to be inventoried at a true value. 
The plaintiff introduced evidence as to the method of 
establishing the value of property repossessed, and the 
facts show that the value was not arbitrarily reached as 
stated in appellant' brief, page five, but was based upon 
taking the average of the high and low monthly selling 
price of these machines for the period as determined by 
statistics suppled in the price list of "Cash Box," a peri-
odical published for the music industry, and ~hat these 
prices fairly and accurately indicated the true value of the 
machines and that this was the common and usual prac-
tice of valuation in the industry (Tr. 30, 31). 
The plaintiff, Wesley Knudsen, testified that after re-
possession, the machines were put on his sales floor and 
that they were not differentiated from any other machine. 
He stated, contrary to the appellant's brief, page six, that 
all the machines were sold and that he had records of sale 
except for one machine, a Model 1015 which, through an 
error in bookkeeping, the serial number had not been tak-
en but that he knew it had not been sold for more than 
$275.00 for that was the highest amount for any time that 
year that a Model 1015 had been sold for (Tr. 12, 19, 21, 
23, 25). 
The respondent also refutes the facts as the defend-
ant states them as to evidence of resale on page six of his 
brief. The plaintiff offered in evidence invoices of sale on 
every machine but the 1015 mentioned ~supra and with the 
names of those who purchased and their addresses and 
the amount on the four different machines, and that they 
were sold for a total of $815.00 (Tr. 12, 19, 21, 23, 25). He 
testified that the other 1015 machine, without serial num-
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ber, could not have been sold for more than $275.00 and al-
lowing a $275.00 amount as a credit in addition to the 
$815.00, it totals $1090.00, which is merely a matter of cal-
culation as the court indicated (Tr. 25). However, he gave 
the defendant a credit on his books of $1185.00 as per the 
"·Cash Box" value, (Tr. 17, 26) whi-ch was the reasonable 
value of the machines at the date of repossession (Tr. 27). 
The appellant's brief, page six, states that the evidence 
of resale is stricken from the record upon the plaintiff's 
motion (Tr. 39); however, this is not true and all evidence 
of resale was stricken from the record upon the defend-
ant's motion (Tr. 39). 
The defendant, in his answer and counterclaim to the 
plaintiff's complaint, alleges merely a rescission of the con-
tract or denies that the contract was performed. The de-
fendant did not appeal to the equity of the court and did 
not, in any way, allege any breach of warranty. 
The court found that there was no evidence of rescis-
sion and that the plaintiff did perform his contract (Tr. 
116, 117) ; that the defendant, in the case below did find 
some minor defects in the machines but that there was no 
representation by the plaintiff as to the condition of the 
machines (Tr. 117). 
The court also found that the vendee was experienced 
in this type of business and that it was not until the sec-
ond payment was past due that the defendant repudiated 
the contract (Tr. 117). 
The court found that the contract had been completely 
negotiated (Tr. 115) and that the defendant signed the 
same with full knowledge of its terms and provisions (Tr. 
116). 
The court found that the plaintiff, shortly after the 
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repossession of the machines, made a careful examination of 
the local market value of the machines and gave the de-
fendant, Jack Masterson, a credit of $1185, the then rea-
sonable value of the machines (Tr. 118). 
From this judgment the defendant appeals. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
The trial court did not err in entering a judgment in 
favor of the plaintiff, said judgment being in accordance 
with the law and evidence. 
POINT II 
The trial court did not err in making and entering the 
finding of fact Number Four to the effect that the plain-
tiff had done and performed all the steps and conditions 
of the contract to be performed by it at the time and the 
manner therein specified. 
POINT ill 
The trial court did not err in making finding of fact 
Number Nine, that the sum of $1185.00 was the reason-
able value of the machines at the time of the repossession, 
said finding being in accordance with the evidence. 
POINT IV 
The trial court did not err in making and entering find-
ing of fact Number Ten, that any defect that there may 
have been in the machines is immaterial, said finding be-
ing in accordance with the evidence and defendant not al-
leging any claim for breach of warranty. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
POINT V 
The trial court did not err in making and entering the 
conclusion of law Number One, to the effect that the plain-
tiff is entitled to a judgment against the defendant in the 
amount of $1,860.96, there being sufficient evidence to sup-
port the conclusion. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL- COURT DID NOT ERR IN ENTERING 
A JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF, SAID 
J'UDGMENT BEING IN ACCO·RD·ANCE WITH THE LAW 
AND THE EVIDENCE. 
It is true that the trial court found that the plaintiff 
had been damaged by the defendant's breach of contract 
and was entitled to the difference between the contract 
price and the value of the machines at the time the defend~ 
ant was given a credit on the books of the plaintiff's com-
pany. The respondent contends like the appellant that the 
rights of the parties after repossession are to be determined 
by the terms of the contract; however, the appellant fails 
to- consider the entire terms of the contract in his argu-
ment on the first point. 
The defendant assumes that all evidence of resale was 
stricken upon the plaintiff's motion. He is in error in this 
assumption. The transcript (p. 39) dfeinitely shows that 
all evidence of resale was stricken on defendant's motion 
in the trial court and upon his objection that such evidence 
of resale was too remote from the date of repossession. 
_ The law is not confused as to a party's position on an 
objection such as this on appeal. There have been similar 
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cases where a party has tried to take advantage of an er-
ror of his own making. In Guedon v. Rooney, 160 Ore. 
621, 87 Pac. 2d 209, the court said: 
"A party is not in a position to claim error in re-
spect to the exclusion of evidence ·to the admission of 
which he has objected.'' 
In another similar case, Zindell v. Central Mutual In-
surance Co., 22 Wis. 575, 269 N. W. 327, the court said: 
''Defendant in an action for damages to a building 
by tort cannot take ·advantage of the failure of the 
trial court to limit the damages recoverable to the 
amount of the diminished value as the result of the 
tqrt- if ·such ·amount is less· than the cost of- the repair, 
where upon his objection the -court excluded the plain-
tiff's offer to prove the diminished value by proving 
the -value of the building as it was before and after col-
lission.'' 
There is ample authority on this question; however, 
American Jurisprudence has put is in the following lang-
uage: 
"On the same principle, a party cannot complain 
of the exclusion of evidence and consequent de~ect in 
the proof if it was excluded up~n his request. Simi-
larly one who has brought about the erroneous exclu- · 
sion of documentary .evidence is not in a position to 
complain of the introduction of secondary evidence." 
3 American Jurisprudence 432, sec. 880. 
American Jurisprudence. cited Pulsifer v. Walker, 85 
N. H. 434, 149 A. 426 as authority for the above textual 
material. 
It is the respondent's contention that this is perhaps 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
not the true solution to the matter, but it does rebut the 
appellant's contention on point one. 
The appellant sets out what he considers to be the 
rights and remedies of the parties after repossession; how-
ever, he fails to include Paragraph 8 of the contract which 
is quoted below and which also sets out the rights of the 
parties after repossession: 
"Seller shall have the right to enforce one or more 
remedies hereunder, successively or concurrently and 
such action shall not stop or prevent the seller from 
pursuing any other remedy hereunder, and any re-
possession, retaking, or sale of the property pursuant 
to the terms hereof shall not release the purchaser 
until the purchase price has been paid in full in cash, 
nor shall the institution of suit for the purchase price 
prevent seller from later retaking possession of said 
property by action or otherwise. Purchaser hereby 
waives the right to remove any legal action from the 
court originally acquiring jurisdiction." 
Appellant's entire contention overlooks the fact that 
in Paragraph 6, Ex. A., which says that in the event of 
such repossession, the seller ''may'' resell. You would as-
spme from the appellant's argument that "may" is man-
datory, but this is not true. "May" is a discretionary word. 
It alows an option to the seller to either resell or not to 
resell. Words and Phrases sets out the following defini-
tions of the word "may": 
"'May' does not mean 'shall' and is not so con-
strued in private contracts. It is only in the case of 
statutes by which public rights are involved that this 
construction is sometimes adopted ex debito justitiae." 
Northwestern Traveling Men's Association v. Craw-
ford, 126 Ill. App. 468, 480. 
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"The word 'may' is usually only permissive or dis-
cretionary." State v. Stepp, 59 S. E. 1068, 63 W. Va. 
254. 
The defendant also ignores the fact that if the seller 
sells, he may sell at a private sale and without notice to the 
purchaser, and the seller may bid at such sale. Giving the 
words their full and natural import, it is evident that the 
seller may repossess the property in behalf of the purchaser 
and sell it to himself at a private sale, crediting the amount 
to the account of the purchaser. The result would not be 
different than that of the principal case. The plaintiff re-
possessed the property from the defendant, took it into his 
workshop, repaired and serviced it, put it on his sales. floor, 
and gave the defendant a credit for it at its actual market 
value. This, in fact, constitutes a sale to himself, which he 
could do under the terms of the contract, and it is clearly 
within the rights of the seller after repossession. From 
that time on, the plaintiff has the right to damages between 
the amount credited to defendant and the original contract 
price. 
The language of the contract is intentionally broad 
enough to cover this situation. Such a transaction is usual 
in this type of business and constitutes a private sale with-
out notice, and at which sale the seller was the purchaser. 
All the law requires is that the sale be fair, and the record 
clearly indicated that in this case the amount credited to 
the defendant was the actual value of the machines and 
more than they eventually sold for. In Pussley v. McLana-
han Bros., 14 Ga. App. 366, 80 S. E. 902, the court said: 
"It has been held in a case involving a contract 
provision for resale, that a sale by the vendor to him-
self. even though the sale is free from fraud, is void-· 
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able at the option of the vendee, providing the vendee 
tenders the payment of the debt secured by the prop-
erty.'' 
It will be noted in this case that the vendee has never 
tendered payment of the purchase price so, consequently, 
has never avoided such sale. 
By Paragraph 8, quoted supra, the seller may enforce 
any of his remedies successively or concurrently. That 
paragraph mentions particularly that any repossession, re-
taking or sale shall not . release the purchaser until the pur-
chase price has been paid in full. 
The defendant, in his brief, ·page 14, misquotes the 
facts. The plaintiff's president, Mr. ·Knudsen, testified that 
he did ·know what happened to the machines, and that he 
knew that they had ·been sold, and the price received for 
. . 
each sale. However, the evidence of resale ·was excluded 
upon motion of the defendant. Plaintiff testified and in-
troduced evidence showing that his valuation of the ma-
chines and his credit to the defendant on the books of the 
company was not an arbitrary figure, but was arrived at 
by taking averages of the high and 1ow. sale price of each 
. . "• 
machine during the period immediately ~rior to the. entry 
made on the."'books. of the corppany. His ~alculations and 
figures were based upon nation-wide. statistics as furnished 
in "Cash Box," a periodical circula te(l in ~he music ~ndus­
try. It is apparent that the court. considered th~s to be a 
private sale to the plaintiff, and allowed it as a fair sale. 
Regardless of this, the defendant .cannot take advantage 
by claiming no evidence of resale when such evidence was 
excluded upon his own motion~ 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN MAKING 
AND ENTERING THE FINDING OF F ACf NUMBER 
FOUR TO THE EFFECT THAT THE PLAINTIFF HAD 
DONE AND PERFORMED ALL THE STEPS AND CON-
DITIONS OF THE CONTRACT TO BE PERFORMED 
BY IT AT THE TIME AND MANNER THEREIN SPE- . 
CIFIED. 
The plaintiff had sold three machines to the defend-
ant on a prior contract. These machines had become used 
and dated and also the defendant was behind in his pay-
ments. The plaintiff required the defendant to bring his 
payments up to date or he would have to repossess the me-
~hines. In order to prevent this from hapening, the de-
fendant made arrangements with the plaintiff to refinance 
the contract with the Lockhart Company, and at this time, 
trade in his two old Model 1100's on two new Model 1080's 
(Tr. 6, 7, 9, 10, 92). This contract was dated February 27, 
1950. There is no evidence that the Model 1100's were 
traded for any other reason other than that they were used 
machines and not working as satisfactorily as new ma-
chines would. The defendant's argument is such as to in-
fer that this new contract was made because of some de-
fect in the 1100 machines. The evidence clearly rebuts 
this inference. 
There is abselutely no doubt that the Model 1080's 
sold to the defendant were new machines (Tr. 10, 42, 44, 
51). The evidence that they were rusted or corroded was 
not convincing and did not impress the trial court, nor was 
it sufficient to overcome the testimony of the plaintiff that · 
the machines were in good working condition, and that . 
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there was no evidence of rust or corrosion having been on 
them at any time. 
We assume that the citations quoted by the defendant 
are correct; however, they are misapplied. There is abso-
lutely no evidence that the plaintiff failed to perform any 
condition of the contract. He made no warranties (Ex. A 
Paragraph 4) and the appellant stated that he read the 
contract and that he was familiar with its terms, that he 
had been in the business for a number of years, and that 
he had purchased under this type of contract many 
times before. The seller did everything it was required 
to do under the contract. It delivered to the defendant the 
new machines. Any statement by the appellant that these 
Model 1080 machines were not new is contrary to the evi-
dence. The defendant testified that there was a manufac-
turer's warranty on the machines, that he read the war-
ranty, and that it protected him from any defects, work-
manship or parts and that there was no warranty made 
by the plaintiff in any respect. It is submitted that this 
finding is in accordance with the evidence. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID N·OT ERR IN MAKING 
FINDING OF FACT NUMBER NINE, THAT THE SUM 
OF $1,185.00 WAS THE RE.A:S.O·NABLE V AIJUE OF THE 
MACHINES cAT THE TIMEJ OF THE REPOSSESSION, 
SAID FINDING BEING IN A~CCORDANCE WITH: THE 
EVIDENCE. 
Wesley Knudsen, President of the plaintiff corpora-
tion, testified as to the method of determining the value of 
the machines at the time the credit was given to the de-
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fendant (Tr. 30, 31). This sum was not an arbitrary fig-
ure, but was based upon statistics found in "Cash Box", a 
monthly periodical circulated in the mu·sic industry. These 
figures show the high and low sale prices of particular 
makes of machines in certain areas of the country, and by 
taking an average of these figures the true representative 
value of the machines was found, which the court stated 
was the fair and reasonable value of the machines. As the 
transcript indicated, the credit was actually more than the 
machines resold for. As stated supra, the plaintiff attemp-
ted to introduce evidence of the final resale of the ma-
chines, but this evidence was excluded upon objection of 
the defendant. There is no doubt that this finding is in 
accordance ~th the evidence. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN MAKING 
AND ENTERING FINDING OF FACT NUMBER TEN, 
THAT ENY DEFECf THAT THERE MAY HAVE BEEN 
IN THE MACHINES IS IMMATERIAL, SAID FINDING 
BEING IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE EVIDENCE AND 
DEFENDANT NOT HAVING ALLEGED ANY CLAIM 
FOR BREACH OF WARRANTY. 
The defendant testified that he knew o the terms of 
the contract; that he was aware of Paragraph 4 of the con-
tract (Ex. A) which stated: 
"No warranties, representations or agreements 
have been made by Seller unless specifically set forth 
herein, and this contract may not be enlarged, modi-
fied, or altered except by endorsement hereon signed 
by the parties hereto." 
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The plaintiff did not make any warranties .either oral or 
in writing. In fact, the plaintiff made no warranties at all. 
The defendant testified that he knew of the warranty made 
by the manufacturer as to the workmanship and the work-
ing parts of the machine. The evidence indicates that he 
felt the machines were satisfactory enough to put on lo-
cation, and he felt that they were serviceable because he 
made no complaint to the plaintiff that the machines were 
defective until Mr. Knudsen called him by phone and 
asked him to make a payment on the contract or the ma-
chines would be repossessed. Even at this time, Mr. Knud-
sen testified, the only defect the defendant mentioned was 
that the machines needed oiling when he received them. 
We would submit that the authority cited by the ap-
pellant is correct, Jones on Chattel Mortgages and Condi-
tional Sales, Vol. 3, Sec. 1331; however, he does not empha-
size that particular part of his citation which is quoted as 
follows: 
"One of the essentials of a rescission is that the 
vendee must return, or offer to return the goods to 
the vendor or show why such return can not be made. 
Moreover, the right of rescission must be exercised 
promptly upon discovery by the vendee of the facts 
which give rise to it, as where the vendor is claimed to 
have made false representations concerning the prop-
erty." 
The evidence would indicate that the defendant's con-
tention that the machines were defective was an after-
thought, arrived at as a defense to payment after threat 
of repossession was made by the plaintiff. 
There was no evidence of rescission introduced by the 
defendant. If the defendant had intended to rescind, ,he is 
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required to act promptly. The following is submitted as 
authority on this point: 
"One having the right to rescind a contract must 
assert it without delay." Wall vs. Zynda, 283 Mich. 
260, 278 N. W. 66. 
"A right to rescind, abrogate or cancel a contract 
must be exercised promptly on discovery of the facts 
from which it arises; and may be waived by continu-
ing to treat the contract as a subsisting obligation." 
Nelson vs. Chicago Mill and Lumber Corporation, 100 
A.L.R. 87, 76 F. 2d 17. 
"A party to a contract cannot avail himself of the 
benefits of it and at the same time deny the responsi-
bilities imposed by it." Nelson vs. Chicago Mill and 
Lumber Corporation, 100 A.L.R 87, 76 F. 2d 17. 
In this case the defendant knew about the alleged de-
fect upon opening the crates. If these defects were so ma-
terial as to justify a rescission, he should have acted then, 
but he states that he felt the machines were good enough 
to put on location, and he did put them on location and 
kept them there for over five weeks. No notice of rescis-
sion was tendered to the plaintiff, and not until the plain-
tiff had called the defendant on the phone to demand pay-
ment on the contract did the defendant mention any defect 
in the machines, but even at this time he did not indicate 
a rescission, as the facts show. The Utah Supreme Court 
has put it as follows: 
"While the buyer need not rescind the sale im-
mediately upon discovering the grounds therefore, he 
must rescind within a reasonable time after discover-
ing the facts justifying rescission; what is a reason-
able time depending on the circumstances. * * * 
Whether the right to rescind was exercised with a 
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reasonable time is usually regarded as a question of 
fact for the jury." Smith vs. Columbus Buggy Co. et 
al., 123 P. 580, 40 Utah 580. 
Here, if the defendant had a right to rescind, he cer-
tainly did not exercise it promptly and he offered no ex-
planation for his use of the equipment for the period of 
five weeks after knowledge of the defects, if any, was had 
upon opening the ·crates. In fact, there was no rescission. 
There was no meeting of the minds, no agreement 
that the sale would be rescinded or anything of that nature 
decided upon by the plaintiff and defendant. The plaintiff 
ahd performed everything that he was required tb perform 
under the contract. 
The defendant had never made a payment upon the 
-contract. The machines had been in service and on loca-
tion for over five weeks before the defendant even con-
versed with the plaintiff in regard to the machines, and 
this convers~tion was at the plaintiff's bequest and at his 
expense, d~ng a telephone call made by the plaintiff to 
the defenda.nt asking for payment on the contract. If the 
appellant relies upon an implied warranty of fitness for a 
particular purpose, he did not state so in his answer, and 
consequently, did not raise any issue nor put the plaintiff 
to any proof in this respect. American Jurisprudence 
states: 
"In civil cases it is a well-·recognized rule that 
questions not advanced on the original hearing will not 
be considered on the petition for a rehearing." 3 A. J. 
350, Sec. 806. 
But supposing that there is. some evidence of the ma-
chines being defective, nevertheless, there certainly was 
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evidence introduced that the machines were useable and 
serviceable. The amount of the defect is disputable; how-
ever, the trial court found that they were minor. The Utah 
court has ruled in Jorgensen v. Gessell Pressed Brick Com-
pany, 43 Utah 31, 141 p. 460, and as stated in the syllabus 
said: 
. "Findings based on conflicting evidence will not 
be disturbed on appeal." 
In Angerman Co., Inc. v. Edgemont, et. ux., 76 Utah 
394, 290 p. 169, the court stated on p. 403 as follows: 
"The Supreme Court could not interfere with find-
ing of negligence, where evidence was such that rea-
sonable minds might draw opposite inferences from it." 
Based upon the above argument the respondent will 
submit that there was no evidence of a rescission and that 
the finding of the trial court as to the condition of the ma-
chines cannot be disturbed because of the nature of the 
evidence before it. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ENTERING 
A JUDGlVIENT IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF, SAID 
JUDGMENT BEING IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE 
LAW AND EVIDENCE. 
The defendant fails to take into consideration that al-
though in the conclusion of law, the court states that the 
plaintiff is entitled to a judgment in the sum of $1,860.96, 
the balance due on the contract, that it also said that the 
defendant is entitled to a credit of $1 ,185.00, and that these 
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two provisions must be read together to determine what 
the court meant as a final judgment. The net judgment 
rendered shows that it is not for the full contract price, but 
merely for the amount due the seller after the buyer had 
been given credit for the value of the merchandise repos-
sessed. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant states that the trial court's findings were 
contrary to the evidence in every one of his Points for Ar-
gument. Assuming, without admitting, that there may be 
some merit in the appellant's contention, the ultimate ques-
tion before the appellate court is whether the trial court 
has arrived at a correct conclusion. It is interested only 
incidentally, if at all, in the process of reasoning by which 
such conclusion was reached. The Utah Court has said in 
Ketchum Coal Co. v. District Court of Carbon County, et 
al., 48 .Utah 342, 159 P. 737: 
"We need not concern ourselves with all that the 
court may have said. Its reasons for dismissing the 
action against the company are not controlling. The 
controlling question is whether the dismissal can be 
sustained in law." 
In Burningham v. Burke, 67 Utah 90, 245 P. 977, this 
same court has said: 
"Though the ·c·ourt erred in granting the motion 
on the particular ground on which it was granted, still 
if it ought to have been granted on one or more of the 
other grounds of motion; the ruling will nevertheless 
be upheld., 
The respondent submits that the judgment of the trial 
court is correct and that the judgment should be sustained, 
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and that if there is any error committed by the trial court, . 
it is an error of which the appellant cannot take advantage, · 
it being an error of his own making. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JACKSON B. HOWARD, 
Attorney for Respondent 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
